(LONDON) – Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic has failed to significantly distract NATO forces, according to defence analysis, with British officials suggesting elements of the deployment may have been intended as a decoy.<\/p>\n
Speaking on Times Radio\u2019s Frontline programme, The Sun\u2019s defence editor Jerome Starkey outlined the operation, citing remarks by UK Defence Secretary John Healey. The deployment involved specialised Russian submarines linked to deep sea operations and potential sabotage missions.<\/p>\n
\u201cThese are Russia\u2019s most advanced, most well resourced sabotage submarines, capable, some of them, of diving to extraordinary depths around six kilometres,\u201d Starkey said. He added that such vessels typically operate in pairs, with a larger \u201cmothership\u201d submarine carrying a smaller submersible that is deployed near a target.<\/p>\n
Satellite imagery released by Healey indicated the presence of a modified Delta IV class submarine, possibly Podmoskovye, likely carrying a smaller vessel. The group was escorted by an Akula class attack submarine.<\/p>\n
\u201cThe Akula is not the most sophisticated Russian submarine,\u201d Starkey noted. \u201cIt is quiet, but perhaps on a par with the old Royal Navy Trafalgar class boats, not as quiet as an Astute class. NATO can and did detect it.\u201d<\/p>\n
Healey suggested the escort may have been intended to draw attention. \u201cHe thought it was a decoy sent to deliberately distract NATO forces whilst the GUGI submarines went about their business,\u201d Starkey said.<\/p>\n
However, he questioned that assessment, citing sources familiar with submarine warfare. \u201cThe GUGI vessels are very noisy. They are relatively easy to detect. They are not stealth submarines, they are sabotage submarines. We can hear them, we can follow them, but we cannot go as deep as them.\u201d<\/p>\n
The activity took place in the Greenland Iceland UK gap, a key maritime corridor through which Russian submarines must pass from northern bases into the Atlantic. NATO routinely monitors this choke point.<\/p>\n
Healey said there was no evidence of damage to undersea infrastructure, although checks were ongoing. These likely involved unmanned systems deployed from support vessels such as HMS Proteus, which was reportedly in dock at the time.<\/p>\n
Starkey highlighted broader concerns about UK naval readiness, noting that several Royal Navy submarines were unavailable due to maintenance or deployment cycles. He described this as part of a wider issue of limited resources affecting operational capacity.<\/p>\n
Beyond submarine activity, the discussion also covered electronic warfare and GPS disruption. Starkey recounted experiences of GPS jamming, including on a flight carrying former UK defence secretary Grant Shapps.<\/p>\n
\u201cPilots relied on alternative navigation systems as they are trained to do,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n
In Ukraine, GPS disruption is common near the front line, affecting both Ukrainian and Russian operations. \u201cThe blue dot will suddenly jump several miles. It is disconcerting at first, but you get used to it,\u201d Starkey said.<\/p>\n
He noted that while GPS disruption can be managed, attacks on critical infrastructure such as internet cables or energy pipelines would pose a far greater challenge.<\/p>\n
The conversation also touched on Ukraine\u2019s growing domestic defence production. Starkey said Ukraine has increased output of drones and long range weapons, contributing to strikes on Russian oil infrastructure and boosting morale.<\/p>\n
\u201cMorale ebbs and flows, but it appears to be on the rise,\u201d he said, citing stabilisation along parts of the front and modest Ukrainian advances.<\/p>\n
He added that Ukraine\u2019s historical role in Soviet era weapons development has supported rapid innovation. \u201cWeapons are designed, developed and tested very quickly. There is a strong sense of urgency and innovation.\u201d<\/p>\n
The discussion was broadcast on Times Radio\u2019s Frontline programme.<\/p>\n