(JUBA) – A Revealing Insight into China’s Troubled Oil Gambit in Africa and What It Means for South Sudan
A rare insider account by a veteran PetroChina executive has exposed the deepening difficulties facing China’s energy investments in Africa, including in countries that have long influenced South Sudan’s own oil and political landscape. The essay, published under the pseudonym “General Lu,” offers a frank retrospective of PetroChina’s 30 year journey on the continent, beginning with its 1995 entry into Sudan then a united country.
The timing of this reflection is symbolic. In July 2025, China marks three decades since PetroChina’s first major overseas operation, launched in Sudan. That early deal was once celebrated as a turning point for both PetroChina and China’s global energy ambitions. It transformed the state owned firm from a domestic operator into a multinational force, building two 15 million ton oil fields and industrial infrastructure in record time.
However, according to General Lu, that golden age has given way to instability, rising risks and growing resentment from host nations. His essay, though anonymous, reads like an internal warning to Chinese policymakers: the Africa strategy needs urgent reassessment.
Among the key challenges outlined are five serious risks now facing Chinese investments:
| Risk | Description |
|---|---|
| Resource nationalism | Military led African governments are demanding more control and profits, using “resource sovereignty” as justification for targeting foreign firms. |
| US–China rivalry on African soil | African leaders are leveraging U.S–China tensions to extract favourable deals, playing both powers against each other. |
| Security vacuum and armed violence | Coups and Western troop withdrawals have left infrastructure like the Niger–Benin pipeline vulnerable to attacks. |
| New geopolitical players | Countries like Russia, Turkey, and the UAE are now entering Africa’s energy scene, outmanoeuvring China’s traditional hands off approach. |
| Volatile investment environments | Unpredictable laws and arbitrary penalties are eroding Chinese investor confidence and disrupting long term planning. |
For South Sudan, where oil exports still account for about 90% of government revenue, these developments could foreshadow greater challenges. Many of the same patterns i.e. fragile politics, foreign investor fatigue and armed group interference are already present in the country. PetroChina’s legacy operations in Unity and Upper Nile states have long underpinned the economy, but rising regional uncertainty may impact future investments.
The essay also details how recent coups, particularly the 2023 military takeover in Niger, are part of a broader trend. The junta there expelled foreign forces, nationalised French uranium mines and began pressuring Chinese firms under the guise of restoring “economic independence.” Similar dynamics are unfolding in places like the Democratic Republic of Congo, where Western and Chinese companies are competing for access to strategic minerals.
The author notes that President Félix Tshisekedi of the DRC reportedly offered the Americans access to cobalt and other critical minerals in exchange for military assistance against rebel forces. Chinese firms, meanwhile, are increasingly being harassed or subjected to stricter operating terms.
PetroChina’s Niger–Benin pipeline has suffered repeated attacks, not only by militants but allegedly by rebel groups backed by Western interests intent on dislodging Chinese influence. In response, Russia’s Africa Corps (formerly Wagner) and other private security firms from Turkey and the UAE have stepped in, offering “security for resources” deals that Beijing cannot match due to its non interference principle.
Even as China’s role faces erosion, General Lu proposes a path forward:
| Strategy | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Extend oil and gas partnerships | Focus on maintaining and renegotiating contracts in countries where existing infrastructure remains viable. |
| Invest in critical minerals jointly | Partner with Western firms to spread political and operational risk in high stakes sectors like cobalt and rare earths. |
| Add renewables to oil infrastructure | Combine oil production with solar and wind projects to adapt to climate transitions and reduce energy poverty. |
| Align projects with local development | Improve access to affordable energy in host countries to reduce political backlash and enhance goodwill. |
In South Sudan’s case, the push for diversification is urgent. While the country’s oil reserves still have economic value, volatility in global politics and local governance puts those revenues at long term risk. International investors are increasingly risk averse, and the warning signs outlined may affect future cooperation with foreign partners.
South Sudan’s own contracts with Chinese oil firms have already been affected amid calls for energy diversification. Juba may have to rethink its own energy diplomacy. Chinese capital, once a guaranteed pillar, may no longer be a reliable cushion.
