A growing body of analysis from Ukrainian and independent sources suggests that the Russian Army is struggling to maintain and expand its capacity for large scale offensive operations. Observers point to persistent difficulties in mobilising personnel, reductions in financial incentives and structural weaknesses in recruitment as limiting factors in the Kremlin’s ongoing war effort in Ukraine.
The Russian government recently amended its mobilisation laws, extending reserve call-ups and training throughout the year rather than restricting them to spring and autumn cycles. Officials explained this change reflects an inability to attract sufficient volunteers under the existing system. Analysts said that, while this arrangement allows Russia to sustain its current force levels, it does not provide a viable path to scale up its operations or launch deeper offensive campaigns.
Compounding these problems, Russia’s system of financial incentives for military service has deteriorated. Previously, signing a contract with the Russian armed forces could offer recruits what was described as roughly three times a typical annual income with additional bonuses. Under current exchange rates, 210,000 Russian rubles per month equates to about US$2,630 (using a rate of approximately 80.3 rubles per US dollar).
However, these bonus payments have been sharply reduced or removed in many regions. Recruits often must spend a large share of their pay on basic equipment, fuel and food because standard military issue is of low quality. Reports indicate that between 50 and 80 per cent of a soldier’s payments might go towards their own supplies, leaving little material incentive to serve at the front. Commanders can penalise those who do not buy equipment for themselves, including by assigning them to high-risk assault missions.
The combination of weaker financial inducements and the need for recruits to self-finance essential gear has undermined Russian efforts to attract volunteers and maintain troop morale. Analysts say this dynamic reflects a broader breakdown in the social contract between the Kremlin and its population, one premised on political loyalty in exchange for economic stability and security. As this contract erodes, fewer people are willing to enlist.
Western and Ukrainian observers highlight that Russia’s inability to mobilise at scale undermines its capacity to escalate the conflict, even if its leadership emphasises nuclear capabilities as a threat. They argue that most potential tactical or strategic use of such weapons would neither change the battlefield situation nor sway Ukrainian resistance.
On the Ukrainian side, changes in political and military leadership have continued. The head of Ukrainian military intelligence has been appointed to lead the presidential administration, a move that has generated commentary about its implications for governance and coordination in Kyiv. Ukrainian officials are also enacting reforms within the defence ministry to better adapt to evolving wartime requirements.