(LONDON) – Russia’s intelligence services undermined their own war effort in Ukraine through corruption, internal rivalry and systematic disinformation passed up to the Kremlin, according to Christopher Steele, a former British intelligence officer who once headed the Russia desk at MI6.
Speaking on Times Radio’s Front Line programme, Steele said vast sums of money allocated by the Kremlin for covert operations in Ukraine before the full scale invasion were misused, leaving Russian decision makers with a dangerously distorted picture of political and military realities on the ground.
Steele said that between 2014 and 2022 the Kremlin, under Russian dictator Vladimir Putin, allocated up to 5 billion US dollars to subversive and political influence operations in Ukraine. At current exchange rates, this amount is equivalent to roughly 5 billion US dollars or about 3.9 billion pounds sterling. According to Steele, much of this funding was siphoned off by officers of the Federal Security Service, known as the FSB, and by businesses linked to the agency.
Steele said the loss of funds was matched by false reporting sent back to Moscow. Intelligence officers on the ground allegedly reassured the Kremlin that Ukraine would collapse quickly under pressure and that Russian forces would be welcomed as liberators. These reports also suggested that pro Russian political networks were strong enough to take control once Kyiv fell.
One of the figures highlighted was Viktor Medvedchuk, a Ukrainian politician long associated with Moscow. Steele said Russian intelligence assessments claimed that such figures could easily assume power and turn Ukraine into a compliant state similar to Belarus. That assessment proved entirely wrong.
Steele explained that the core problem was not simply bad analysis but a system that rewarded telling the leadership what it wanted to hear. In his view, corruption and fear combined to produce intelligence that confirmed preconceived assumptions rather than tested them.
He said intelligence plays an unusually central role in Russian politics, a legacy of the Soviet system. Many senior figures in government and business come from intelligence backgrounds, including Putin himself, a former KGB officer. This, Steele said, shapes how power is exercised and how information flows to the top.
According to Steele, this culture tends to produce strong tactical thinking but weak strategic judgement. Personal relationships are overemphasised, while long term consequences are often underestimated. He argued that Western leaders have historically struggled to understand this mindset when dealing with Moscow.
Russia currently operates three main intelligence services. The SVR handles foreign intelligence, the FSB focuses on internal security and influence operations in neighbouring states, and the GRU is a military intelligence agency known for aggressive actions such as sabotage and assassinations. Steele said rivalry between these organisations often leads to overlapping responsibilities and poor coordination.
Before the 2022 invasion, the FSB had primary responsibility for Ukraine. Steele said its failure there was decisive. Corrupt use of funds and misleading reports meant that when Russian forces advanced on Kyiv, the Kremlin was unprepared for strong Ukrainian resistance and national unity.
Steele also addressed how information control has evolved. He said Russian disinformation increasingly spreads through Western platforms rather than purely Russian outlets. Social media networks, particularly X, were described as key channels through which false stories are amplified to large international audiences.
He warned that this has blurred the line between truth and falsehood in many societies, making informed debate more difficult. In his view, this erosion of agreed facts represents a serious security challenge beyond the battlefield.
On Putin’s leadership style, Steele said the Russian dictator lives in an information bubble but is not entirely detached from reality. Major military failures, such as the retreat from the Kyiv region, cannot be ignored. However, he argued that the constant filtering of bad news means strategic errors are repeated.
Steele said fear within the system discourages honest reporting. Those who deliver unwelcome assessments risk punishment, while those who present optimistic narratives are rewarded. This dynamic, he said, affects not only military decisions but also Russia’s foreign policy and economic planning.
He also discussed the international dimension of the war, including relations with the United States. Steele said Putin sees former US president Donald Trump as a potential lifeline, arguing that Trump has repeatedly shown scepticism towards Ukraine and traditional US alliances. Steele described this dynamic as deeply concerning for European security.
In his assessment, Russia has paid a very high price for limited territorial gains, suffering casualties on a scale that is difficult to justify domestically. This makes any imposed settlement unstable, particularly if it requires Ukraine to surrender fortified cities that protect its capital.
Looking ahead, Steele said a durable peace in 2026 is unlikely unless Ukraine remains militarily strong. He argued that only sustained financial, military and diplomatic support from European allies can deter further Russian aggression. In his view, security guarantees outside NATO are insufficient, citing the failure to enforce the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.
Steele concluded that Ukraine has shown willingness to negotiate, but within clear limits dictated by its security and sovereignty. Russia, he said, has not demonstrated the same readiness. The outcome of the war, he argued, will shape not only Ukraine’s future but the broader security of Europe.
