(BEIJING) – In the early years of the People’s Republic of China, the country lived in the shadow of the Soviet Union. When Mao Zedong travelled to Moscow in 1949, he sought recognition and support from a powerful communist ally. Instead, he was treated as a junior figure, kept waiting and offered little respect by Joseph Stalin. That experience became part of a wider Chinese determination to overcome past humiliations and reclaim influence on the global stage.
More than seven decades later, the balance between Beijing and Moscow has shifted sharply. China is now the stronger partner in its relationship with Russia, a change that has been accelerated by the war in Ukraine. The invasion and the international response to it have weakened Russia’s position and increased its reliance on China across trade, finance and technology.
For much of the Cold War period, the Soviet Union dominated the relationship. Stalin viewed Mao as a subordinate and pushed through agreements that benefited Moscow, including arms deals financed by Chinese loans that carried interest. Mao later adopted many Soviet methods of rule, including strict political control and propaganda, while both leaders shared hostility towards Western influence.
Over time, however, the paths of the two countries diverged. China focused on economic development and integration into global markets, eventually becoming a major industrial and trading power. Russia, by contrast, invested heavily in military strength and pursued an expansive foreign policy that placed strain on its economy without delivering comparable growth.
Despite these differences, Russia retained influence through energy exports and military power. That position began to erode after the full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Western sanctions, diplomatic isolation and restrictions on trade cut Russia off from key markets, particularly in Europe, where oil and gas exports had once generated more than 150 billion US dollars a year.
As European demand fell, Moscow redirected exports eastwards. China became the main destination for Russian oil and gas, giving Beijing significant leverage. Russian crude exports to China rose sharply, from about 800,000 barrels a day in 2021 to more than 2.5 million barrels a day by early 2024. These sales have often been made at discounted prices, reflecting Russia’s limited alternatives.
Natural gas followed a similar pattern. New agreements committed Russia to sharply increase supplies to China over the coming years, supported by large pipeline projects designed to bind the two economies more closely together. This deepened Russia’s dependence on a single major buyer with strong negotiating power.
Trade between the two countries has expanded quickly since the start of the war. Bilateral trade rose from around 107 billion US dollars in 2018 to about 240 billion dollars in 2023, with further growth expected. China has also become central to Russia’s financial system, with the Chinese currency, the renminbi, now widely used in trade settlements and on the Moscow stock exchange.
Before the invasion, Russia held foreign reserves of more than 600 billion US dollars. Roughly half of these were frozen by Western governments, forcing Moscow to turn to alternative currencies and partners. The renminbi has since taken on a larger role in Russia’s reserves and international payments, further strengthening China’s influence.
Military cooperation has also expanded. As Russia’s defence industry came under pressure from sanctions, China emerged as a key supplier of components and technology. Chinese firms have provided machine tools, electronics and materials used in weapons production. While Beijing maintains that it does not supply lethal weapons to Russia, it has sold vehicles, drones and other equipment with clear military applications.
At the same time, China has tried to present itself as a neutral actor and potential mediator in the Ukraine conflict. Its peace proposals have been broad and lacking in detail, focusing on stability and economic impact rather than addressing the causes of the war. These initiatives have been met with scepticism in Ukraine and across Western capitals.
The war has also opened doors for China in areas previously sensitive for Russia. In the Arctic, where Moscow once resisted Chinese involvement, isolation has reduced Russia’s ability to exclude Beijing from development projects. Access to Arctic resources and shipping routes offers China long term strategic and economic benefits.
Russia has made other concessions as well, including large scale agricultural supply agreements that tie it more closely to the Chinese market. These deals reflect Moscow’s need to secure stable partners at a time when options are limited.
Despite this growing imbalance, the relationship is not entirely one sided. Russia remains a major nuclear power and continues to trade with countries such as India, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Its economy has also shown resilience, driven in part by high military spending and continued energy exports outside Europe.
China, for its part, also gains from the partnership. Russia provides energy security, diplomatic support and a testing ground for understanding the impact of Western sanctions. The war in Ukraine has allowed Beijing to observe modern warfare and the performance of military equipment in real conditions, while also serving as a warning about the risks of military aggression.
The evolving relationship suggests a pragmatic alignment rather than a formal alliance. China currently holds greater economic and political leverage, while Russia accepts a junior role to offset isolation and sustain its war effort. How long this arrangement can last remains uncertain, especially given the strong nationalist instincts of the Russian leadership and the long term ambitions of Beijing.
