(JUBA) – When South Sudan’s leaders Salva Kiir and Riek Machar signed the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in 2018, there was hope that the country could move past years of conflict. The agreement, however, directly named the two men instead of their political organisations, which tied the peace process to their personal rivalry rather than to stable institutions.
The agreement also included six other political and armed groups, yet the dominance of Kiir and Machar has continued to define the political landscape. Their frequent disagreements have undermined implementation of the peace deal and made stability elusive.
Tensions escalated last week when Machar and seven senior allies were charged with crimes including treason, murder and conspiracy against the state. Following this, President Kiir suspended Machar from his position as vice chair of the Transitional Government of National Unity. Analysts warn that this decision could put the 2018 peace agreement at risk of collapse.
Since independence in 2011, South Sudan has only experienced short periods of peace. The rivalry between Kiir and Machar has dominated the country’s politics, much like the divisions in Yugoslavia after the death of Marshal Tito. The death of Dr John Garang in 2005 left a vacuum in Southern Sudanese leadership, and his absence has contributed to the rise of political and ethnic competition that continues to fuel conflict.
The cost of this rivalry has been severe. It is estimated that over 400,000 people have died, while millions more have been displaced internally or forced into exile. The peace deal of 2018, shaped by the two personalities rather than inclusive institutions, has failed to address underlying ethnic and regional divisions.
South Sudan’s weak democratic structures, inherited from Sudan, have also contributed to the instability. Armed militias continue to benefit from state resources, with their leaders entrenched in patronage networks. This has created what some observers describe as an “economy of violence”, where chaos provides incentives for groups to sustain conflict rather than pursue peace.
Foreign involvement further complicates the picture. Countries including Egypt, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kenya and Uganda have been linked to supporting different actors in South Sudan’s political rivalry. Sudan’s ongoing civil war has also disrupted oil exports, damaging the pipeline that runs from South Sudan to Port Sudan. This has significantly reduced revenue for Juba, which depends heavily on oil to fund public services.
Oil Revenue Challenges
| Factor | Impact on South Sudan Economy |
|---|---|
| Pipeline damage in Sudan | Reduced oil exports and revenue |
| Dependence on oil | Limited funds for public goods |
| Gold and charcoal smuggling | Loss of state revenue, funds channelled to armed actors |
Oil remains the main source of government revenue, but smuggling of gold and charcoal to neighbouring countries has drained resources further. These activities reportedly finance political elites and their networks, undermining economic growth and governance.
The continued rivalry between Kiir and Machar, coupled with weak state institutions, suggests that peace will remain fragile. The two leaders continue to draw support from ethnic bases within the Dinka and Nuer communities, which has deepened fragmentation in the country.
For businesses and investors, the uncertainty makes planning difficult. Oil sector disruptions, governance risks, and continued instability all reduce confidence. The outlook indicates that unless South Sudan develops stronger institutions and reduces dependence on personalised politics, both peace and economic stability will remain uncertain.
