(UKRAINE) – Ukraine’s armed forces have adopted a revised battlefield approach designed to slow Russian offensives, drain Russian manpower and equipment, and prevent any decisive operational breakthrough, according to military analysts monitoring the war.
Speaking on the Frontline programme, George Barros of the Institute for the Study of War said Ukrainian units trained to NATO standards are increasingly relying on fixing and flanking manoeuvres. These tactics aim to pin Russian forces in place while striking their weaker points, gradually hollowing out Russian troop concentrations rather than attempting rapid territorial gains.
Barros said the broader political and diplomatic context continues to work to Russia’s advantage. He argued that there has been a persistent lack of strategic clarity among Western policymakers in framing Russia as the clear aggressor and saboteur of any effort to end the war. According to his assessment, Russia often succeeds in shaping the narrative around negotiations, particularly at moments when policy shifts in Washington appear close.
He cited repeated instances in which potential breakthroughs in United States policy or high level engagement with Ukraine were disrupted following direct intervention by the Russian dictator Vladimir Putin. In his view, these episodes have consistently undermined diplomatic momentum and reinforced Moscow’s ability to deflect blame onto Ukraine.
Barros stressed that the sequencing of negotiations has repeatedly disadvantaged Kyiv. He said proposed settlement packages are often presented to Ukraine first, where officials agree to most provisions while seeking to negotiate a small number of unacceptable terms. When the same proposals reach Moscow, Russia rejects them outright, yet still manages to portray Ukraine as the obstacle to peace.
He argued that this dynamic obscures the reality that Russia routinely refuses terms that are broadly seen as necessary for a stable end to the war. One example is Moscow’s categorical rejection of any European or Western security presence in Ukraine, including peacekeeping or assurance forces, which analysts widely regard as essential to preventing renewed conflict.
Despite economic strain and its inability to achieve rapid battlefield success, Russia continues to outperform its opponents diplomatically, Barros said. He described this as a sophisticated effort to extract political advantage from a relatively weak position while continuing the war on the ground regardless of ongoing talks.
Turning to the battlefield, Barros addressed the situation around Pokrovsk and neighbouring towns, areas that Russian forces have sought to encircle through incremental advances and infiltration. Open source mapping suggests Russian units have penetrated parts of central settlements, raising concerns about Ukrainian supply routes.
He cautioned, however, that such maps represent snapshots based on delayed and incomplete information. Control of key roads often changes hands, sometimes within days, and combat footage frequently surfaces long after it was recorded. As a result, apparent breakthroughs may not reflect the current reality on the ground.
Based on available evidence, Barros said Ukrainian forces are still operating in limited capacities in and around contested towns. Russian claims that these areas were fully captured in late 2025 were described as premature, mirroring earlier assertions about other locations that later proved inaccurate.
He noted that even where Russia has pressured supply routes, these roads have already been rendered largely unusable by persistent drone surveillance and strikes. Ukrainian units have been forced to rely on minor routes or cross country movement for many months, reducing the operational value of any single road seizure.
Barros said Russian forces are likely to take these towns eventually, but he emphasised that their fall would not trigger a wider collapse of Ukraine’s defensive lines in Donetsk region. He rejected suggestions that such gains would open the way for a rapid or sweeping Russian advance.
Instead, he forecast a continuation of grinding positional warfare. Russian units may regroup or redeploy elsewhere, but any progress is expected to remain slow and costly. In his assessment, the symbolic importance Moscow has attached to certain towns is likely to fade once their capture fails to deliver strategic momentum.
While acknowledging that any loss of territory weakens Ukraine’s defensive depth, Barros said the situation is far from catastrophic. He described the current phase of the war as one of attrition rather than imminent collapse.
Across most of the front, Russian advances remain limited. Barros identified one sector, along the boundary between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions, as a recent area of concern where Russian forces advanced more quickly than elsewhere. Even there, he said progress was slow by the standards of modern mechanised warfare and appears to have been blunted by improved Ukrainian defensive lines and natural barriers such as rivers.
He said Ukraine’s broader objective is not to trade losses indefinitely, but to degrade Russian forces sufficiently to support future counteroffensives. He pointed to earlier fighting near Kupiansk as an example where Russian advances overstretched their units, allowing Ukraine to regain ground after months of attrition.
Such outcomes, he said, depend on effective Ukrainian leadership and well trained units, but also on adequate Western military support. Barros expressed frustration that Ukraine has not been provisioned at the level required to fully exploit these opportunities.
Addressing ongoing diplomatic talks, including meetings involving Ukrainian and American negotiators in Davos, Barros said there is little evidence on the battlefield that Russia believes peace is near. He described the negotiations as uncertain and said he was sceptical about the prospects for meaningful progress.
In his view, the Russian dictator remains content with the current state of the war and has not altered his underlying theory of victory. Barros said Moscow is likely to continue fighting until it can claim control over the occupied regions it has declared as its own, particularly Donetsk.
He added that widespread claims predicting an imminent Russian victory, including assertions that Russian forces would soon reach Kyiv, have consistently proven false. Even on optimistic timelines, he said, Russia would need years to secure its objectives, raising questions about whether its economy and force generation can sustain the current pace of operations.
Barros concluded that while Russia may be able to continue the war for some time, the mounting costs increase the pressure on Moscow. He suggested that the Russian leadership would prefer to avoid a prolonged conflict, even as it shows little sign of changing course.
