(MOSCOW) – Russia has authorised military training assemblies for reservists in 2026, including a new legal category linked to the protection of what the authorities describe as critical infrastructure. The decision comes as Moscow continues to face sustained manpower pressures nearly four years into its full scale invasion of Ukraine.
Under Russian law, annual training assemblies for reservists are presented as routine administrative measures intended to maintain readiness and update records. Officials insist that these assemblies do not amount to mobilisation and cannot legally be used to deploy participants into active combat zones. However, their expansion in a country at war has drawn close scrutiny from analysts and civil society groups.
The Russian dictator Vladimir Putin signed a decree in December 2025 authorising standard reserve assemblies for 2026, followed weeks later by a separate decree introducing special assemblies linked to the mobilisation reserve. While the Kremlin maintains that Russia has sufficient manpower and does not require mass mobilisation, these assurances sit uneasily alongside mounting battlefield losses and persistent reports of recruitment shortfalls across many regions.
Analysts assess that 2025 was the deadliest year for the Russian armed forces since the start of the invasion. At the same time, pressure on federal and regional budgets has reduced the effectiveness of financial incentives previously used to attract contract soldiers. As signing bonuses and regional payments lose appeal, coercive recruitment practices are expected to play a larger role.
These practices reportedly include pressure on state enterprises to supply recruits, intensified efforts to push conscripts into professional contracts, and administrative measures that limit freedom of movement for those who ignore summonses. Such measures are unevenly applied, with rural regions and ethnic republics bearing a disproportionate share of the burden.
Regions such as Bashkortostan and Tatarstan are expected to continue reporting high casualty figures, while Moscow and Saint Petersburg remain relatively shielded. On a per capita basis, ethnic republics including Buryatia, Tuva and Altai are projected to remain among the hardest hit, reflecting earlier waves of mobilisation and limited local capacity to resist federal demands.
Despite fiscal constraints, several ethnic republics increased contract payments in 2025 after recruitment slowed. This decision prioritised short term manpower needs over longer term regional development, reinforcing a pattern in which peripheral regions use human resources as their main political leverage in relations with the centre.
Russian law defines the reserve broadly. It includes former contract soldiers, men who completed compulsory service, men who never served but aged out of conscription, graduates of civilian universities with military departments, and women with military specialisations, particularly in medicine and communications. Age limits vary by rank, with enlisted personnel eligible into their mid fifties, junior officers into their early sixties, and senior officers later still. Women generally remain in the reserve until between 45 and 50.
Traditionally, two types of assemblies existed. Training assemblies refresh skills and procedures, while inspection assemblies test the readiness of units and local military administration. Both are legally restricted to activities inside Russia and explicitly barred from use in combat operations.
In late 2025, however, a third category was introduced. Special assemblies for the protection of critical infrastructure can be activated by presidential decree during armed conflict or counter terrorism operations. These apply to reservists who have signed contracts with the Ministry of Defence and may involve guarding facilities such as power stations, transport hubs or communications nodes, as defined by the government.
Once a decree is issued, regional draft offices deliver summonses and assign duties determined entirely by the Ministry of Defence. Individual assemblies are limited to two months, with lifetime caps depending on reserve status. Refusal to comply can result in travel restrictions, difficulties accessing loans and sustained bureaucratic pressure.
On paper, the system appears orderly. Politically, it reflects a mobilisation framework that has failed to meet the Kremlin’s original objectives. Plans to form new divisions have stalled, with only around half of the divisions announced for 2025 actually created. Units have been reorganised, reserves drawn from unexpected categories, and administrative measures used to mask shortages.
Military analysts note that these assemblies are not mobilisation in name, but they serve to keep the reserve population identifiable, accessible and accustomed to state control. They also normalise a broader militarisation of society, gradually expanding the range of activities considered legitimate military service.
Experts argue that this approach allows the Kremlin to delay politically risky decisions such as a second nationwide mobilisation while still extracting manpower from the population. It also reinforces a system in which individuals are drawn into military roles gradually, whether through guarding infrastructure, logistical tasks or other non frontline duties, with the potential for later escalation.
At the same time, Russia continues to rely on other sources of manpower, including foreign recruits and convicts. Reports of abuse and discrimination against foreign fighters, particularly from Africa and Central Asia, have damaged Moscow’s reputation and may reduce willingness to enlist. The use of convicts, while expedient, raises concerns about combat effectiveness and long term social stability once survivors return home.
Taken together, the expansion of reserve assemblies, the uneven regional burden and the reliance on coercive recruitment point to a state preparing for endurance rather than resolution. While Russian officials deny any intention to escalate mobilisation, the legal and administrative adjustments suggest a system being quietly adapted to sustain a prolonged and costly war.
