(WASHINGTON, DC) – Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine has accelerated the country’s long term decline as an independent great power, pushing it into growing economic and strategic dependence on China, according to analysis by historian and strategist Sarah Paine.
Paine argues that great powers rarely collapse suddenly. Instead, they weaken when major strategic decisions close more options than they create. In her assessment, Russia’s 2022 invasion was intended to restore influence but has instead narrowed Moscow’s room for manoeuvre.
She says sanctions, technological isolation, capital flight and demographic decline have compounded existing structural weaknesses. The war did not create Russia’s vulnerability, she notes, but exposed and intensified long standing problems.
Before 2022, Moscow was able to balance relations between Europe and China. That flexibility has largely disappeared. China has become Russia’s main economic outlet, technology supplier and diplomatic supporter.
Paine describes this relationship as deeply unequal. China retains multiple policy options and trading partners, while Russia increasingly relies on Beijing for markets, financing and political backing.
“The loss of optionality is the core of Russia’s decline,” she said. “Great powers choose their alignments. They are not forced into them.”
She argues that by launching a full scale war against Ukraine, the Russian dictator Vladimir Putin reduced Russia’s strategic space and locked the country into a position of dependence.
Paine also refers to the military concept of “death ground”, derived from the writings of Sun Tzu, which describes a situation in which leaders feel they have no option but to fight because retreat threatens their survival.
Operating in such conditions, she says, encourages escalation and discourages compromise, further limiting strategic flexibility and increasing the cost of correction.
Russia continues to possess nuclear weapons and a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, which remain symbols of great power status. However, Paine argues that these formal attributes increasingly diverge from economic and political reality.
Economic dependence on China, shrinking policy autonomy and growing internal pressures suggest that Russia now negotiates from a position of weakness, despite projecting strength.
She also notes that Beijing is largely indifferent to who governs in Moscow, provided Chinese interests are secured. A weaker Russia, she says, gives China greater leverage in trade, energy and security matters.
Paine describes the invasion of Ukraine as a “pivotal error”, a strategic mistake from which a return to previous conditions is no longer possible. She compares it to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, which fundamentally worsened Tokyo’s strategic position.
She argues that had Putin halted territorial expansion after the seizure of Crimea in 2014, Russia might have preserved access to European markets and energy revenues. Instead, subsequent actions have closed those pathways.
The analysis also highlights the contrast between Russian and Ukrainian motivations. For Ukraine, the war is existential, threatening national survival and cultural identity. For Russia, the stakes are lower, reducing public commitment and resilience.
Paine says this imbalance strengthens Ukraine’s long term position and helps mobilise international support, while Russia faces mounting isolation.
She draws historical parallels with the Second World War, noting how Adolf Hitler’s genocidal policies united opponents and transformed weak states into determined adversaries.
Looking ahead, Paine warns that Russia risks evolving into a highly dependent and isolated state, comparable in some respects to North Korea, over the next generation.
She concludes that Putin’s campaign to restore Russian greatness may instead be remembered as the moment when Russia’s substantive great power status began to erode, even as formal symbols of influence remain.
