(MOWCOW) – The internal stability of the Russian Federation has reached a critical breaking point as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth year. Sources in Kyiv and monitoring networks within Russia report that the fervent public support seen in 2022 has evaporated, replaced by a search for scapegoats as the promise of a lightning victory has devolved into a grinding war of attrition on Russian soil. Analysts warn that with democratic mechanisms dismantled, a palace or military coup remains the only viable avenue for political change in Moscow.
The economic contract between the Kremlin and the populace—trading political passivity for stability—has been irrevocably shattered. Inflation has surged, eroding the value of the rouble, while ordinary citizens report widespread difficulties withdrawing funds from ATMs. The federal budget, once buoyed by vast oil and gas revenues, has been decimated by sanctions and Ukrainian strikes on energy infrastructure. Business closures are accelerating even in wealthy hubs like Moscow, and the promised economic pivot to China has resulted in dependency rather than prosperity.
Discontent has permeated the Russian elite, who are increasingly casting themselves as victims of the dictator’s “special military operation.” Regional politicians, vloggers, and oligarchs who initially enabled the invasion are now privately blaming the Russian dictator for the catastrophic mismanagement of the country. This shift mirrors historical patterns where Russian autocrats are removed by their inner circle once they become a liability to the ruling class. With no genuine elections or legal opposition permitted, the political atmosphere in Moscow is ripe for a sudden, violent transfer of power.
The Kremlin’s geopolitical standing has collapsed alongside its economy. The dictator’s promises to protect allies in the Middle East, Africa, and South America—such as the regimes in Venezuela, Syria, and Iran—have proven hollow, as Russian weaponry and air defence systems fail to perform. Russia’s influence in the Global South has waned, leaving the Kremlin isolated and subservient to Beijing. Domestically, the regime is struggling with the normalisation of violence; the return of traumatised, criminalised veterans has sparked a wave of violent crime, degrading social order and desensitising the public to the prospect of armed upheaval.
Paranoia has reportedly gripped the Russian dictator, who now rarely travels and relies heavily on body doubles and a network of bunkers. Security protocols have intensified, with major highways in the capital closed for his movements, reflecting a deep-seated fear of assassination or mutiny. The dictator has purged potential rivals, including former close allies like Dmitry Kozak and Sergei Lavrov, the latter of whom has faced internal accusations of treason for diplomatic failures. The memory of the Wagner Group’s 2023 march on Moscow remains a potent symbol of the regime’s fragility, as security forces at the time failed to intervene.
The Russian military, demoralised and depleted, poses a significant threat to the Kremlin. Generals are systematically prevented from gaining popularity to avoid challenging the dictator, yet purges continue; the recent suspicious death of a general linked to Wagner highlights the ongoing internal warfare. Frontline soldiers, facing unpaid salaries and appalling conditions, see no clear objective in the war. As the myth of the “Great Russia” crumbles under the weight of military failure and economic destitution, the likelihood of a coordinated move against the dictator by the military or security services (FSB/GRU) is growing increasingly acute.